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The 2008-09 global economic crisis and the recent political 
turmoil in the Middle East have highlighted the urgent need for 
many economies in the region to dramatically increase the number of 
decent jobs. Conditions in the labour market in Jordan represent a stark 
microcosm of this region-wide problem.
 
Despite high rates of growth in the early 2000s, the Jordanian economy 
created relatively few new productive jobs—particularly for Jordanians. 
As a result, many Jordanians have remained economically inactive or 
unemployed, or have emigrated. Meanwhile, many of the low-paid, 
low-skilled jobs created by the country’s economic growth have been 
taken by migrant workers from the rest of the Middle East or Asia. Why 
has this happened?
Some Economic History
In the late 1980s, in response to a severe debt crisis and economic 
collapse, Jordan embraced an ambitious program of structural 
adjustment and economic liberalisation. Initially this program led to 
a currency and banking crisis and increased capital flight out of the 
country. During much of the 1990s the Jordanian economy was also 
rocked by regional shocks, such as the Gulf War of 1990-91.
By the latter half of the 1990s, however, the economy had begun to 
stabilise. However, most of its growth originated from factors such as 
the increased inflow of migrant workers, continuance of high levels of 
foreign assistance and the expansion of the labour force—not from 
more productive and better paying jobs. 
Factors such as tight monetary policies, the constraint of a small 
domestic market and continued vulnerability to regional instability 
continued to undermine domestic investment. So, by 2000 the country 
was again suffering from a high public debt, this time reaching 105% of 
GDP. 
Since then, however, private foreign investment has flowed into the 
country, largely due to the soaring oil profits among Jordan’s Gulf 
neighbours and the immigration of a large number of wealthy Iraqis. 
Thus, Jordan’s annual GDP growth increased from 3.5% during 1996-
2000 to 6% during 2000-05. 
But this improvement in growth has failed to lead to the kind of 
economic diversification that could generate widespread productive 
employment. Instead, the Government’s dominant strategy of 
macroeconomic stabilisation has resulted, in some ways, in more job 
destruction than job creation for Jordanians over the last two decades. 
A Weak Private Sector
While a drive towards fiscal tightening and privatisation has resulted in 
reduced public sector employment, the private sector has generated 
few alternative job opportunities. According to the Department of 
Statistics, for example, 98% of all private firms in Jordan are micro- and 
small enterprises, which employ only 1–4 and 5-19 workers, respectively. 
In addition, the private sector is unable to offer wages and social security 
benefits comparable to those in the public sector.
The Government has tried to deal with this problem by expanding 
export-oriented production, which has been concentrated in the so-
called Qualifying Industrial Zones (QIZs), or special free trade zones. But 
since enterprises in these zones generally offer low wages and poor 
working conditions, the majority of their employees are migrant workers 
(see Figure 1). Because Jordanians are generally more educated, they 
tend to avoid taking such jobs. 
These contradictions in the Jordanian labour market help explain the 
country’s high unemployment rate, which has persisted at levels of 
12-15% in recent years. A general mismatch between the low quality 
of jobs on offer in the economy and the level of skills and education of 
the domestic labour force has led many Jordanians to seek better jobs 
abroad.
The Role of Migrant Workers
In 2009 around 180,000 Jordanians were unemployed, while more than 
335,000 non-Jordanians were working in the kingdom. Between 2001 
and 2005, an estimated 63% of newly created jobs in the kingdom were 
filled by non-Jordanians. Foreign workers now constitute around 20% of 
the country’s labour force. 
These workers have come mainly from other Arab countries, particularly 
Iraq, Palestine and Egypt, and also from South Asia. Most of them are 
young males with low levels of education and skills.
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These statistics highlight a critical paradox in the country’s labour 
market: while there is demand for labour, most job vacancies are either 
filled by migrant workers or remain unfilled. This implies that increasing 
economic growth per se would not succeed in reducing unemployment 
in Jordan. The stumbling block is the kind of jobs that Jordan’s economy 
is producing.
The focus of government policies in recent years has been to attract 
enough foreign investment to generate growth to create 46,000 
additional jobs per year. The goal is to reduce unemployment to 6.8% 
by 2017. Between 2000 and 2005, the economy did indeed create 
24,000-44,000 new jobs per year. But unemployment among nationals 
continued to remain at around 14%. 
The contradiction is that the new jobs created by the growing economic 
sectors, such as apparel manufacturing and construction, tend to be 
low-skilled and low-wage. In addition, as migrant workers accept many 
of these jobs, there is increased downward pressure on national wages, 
and a corresponding increase in both inactivity rates and ‘voluntary’ 
unemployment of Jordanian workers.
The shortage of productive private-sector jobs has meant that many 
new Jordanian entrants into the labour force are willing to remain 
unemployed while they wait for an opportunity in the public sector. In 
2011, for example, about 3.5 million people between 16 and 64 years 
of age have been eligible for work; but only 1.4 million have been 
economically active while 2.1 million have been inactive (with students 
comprising 30% of the latter group). 
The Government’s recent National Strategy for Employment aims 
to replace foreign workers with Jordanian workers in a number 
of economic sectors. At first this would happen in such sectors as 
restaurants and hotels, water and electricity, health, construction, and 
trade. Longer term the priority sectors for such replacement would be 
mining, industry and agriculture. 
However, instead of being preoccupied with such ‘replacement’ issues, 
the country’s employment generation strategy should concentrate on 
expanding the economy’s capacity to generate productive, higher-
wage employment opportunities that correspond more closely with the 
skills and education of the Jordanian labour force. This is particularly 
important for young workers.
Youth Unemployment and Emigration
Jordan has a predominantly young labour force that is growing by 4-5% 
a year. As a result, there are more than 50,000 new entrants into the 
labour market each year. Many of them cannot find decent jobs. For 
example, in 2009, when the total unemployment rate was 14%, more 
than 70% of the unemployed were below the age of 29 years (see Table 
1). 
Unemployment is especially high among relatively educated workers. 
More than 80% of unemployed men are educated at the secondary 
level or higher, while about 75% of unemployed women have an 
intermediate or university level of education.
Given the lack of job opportunities at home, many Jordanian workers 
have emigrated, particularly to the oil-exporting Gulf countries. 
 According to the Ministry of Labour, in 2008 around 300,000 Jordanians, 
or almost 5% of the total population, lived and worked abroad. As a 
result, their remittances represent a major source of income for Jordan. 
Although various regional political upheavals, such as the Gulf War, have 
destabilised remittance income from time to time, it has nonetheless 
continued to be equivalent to at least 20% of GDP. The global financial 
crisis did result in about a 10% decline in Jordan’s remittance income in 
2009, as the Jordanian workers who remained in the Gulf countries were 
obliged to accept lower wages or more precarious working conditions.
Age 
group 
(years) 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
15-19 15.8 13.9 13.2 13.6 13.2
20-29 59.7 60.4 59.3 61.3 58.5
30-39 15.9 15.8 17.5 15.5 16.8
40-49 6.0 6.7 7.2 7.4 7.8
50+ 2.6 3.2 2.7 2.1 3.7
Though remittances represent an important inflow of income, they can 
pose certain problems. For example, remittances can reduce the labour 
force participation rate of Jordanians by acting as a disincentive to work 
for other members of the recipient households. In addition, the net 
impact of remittances sent by Jordanians working abroad is diluted by 
the outflow of remittances from migrant workers labouring in Jordan. 
Concluding Remarks
The challenges facing the Jordanian labour market call for structural 
shifts in the Government’s economic policies to maximise the 
generation of productive employment. Such policy shifts will need 
to take special account of the factors that have led to high levels of 
inactivity, ‘voluntary’ unemployment and emigration of Jordanian 
workers, particularly young workers. 
The Government’s economic strategy will no doubt have to place 
greater weight on the diversification of the economy away from low 
value-added production and exports and towards sectors that can 
sustain the kind of higher-quality and higher-paid jobs that correspond 
more closely to the skills and aspirations of the Jordanian labour force.
Accomplishing these tasks represents a major economic challenge. But 
as recent events in other countries in the Middle East, such as Egypt 
and Tunisia, have demonstrated, the persistent and widespread lack 
of decent employment opportunities is a major contributing factor to 
rising social discontent and political upheaval.
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